Nathan J. Brown and Zaid Al-Ali say that by clearly showing that the constitution can work against the Brotherhood’s interests, the document might still entice those who have felt excluded back into the political process. That is not inevitable or even likely, but it may be Egypt’s best hope to get back on track.
Marc Pierini says that with an economy on the brink of collapse and rising popular discontent with the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s leadership urgently needs to address its economic, political, and security challenges.
Nathan Brown says that the struggle over the orientation of religious institutions in Egypt, highlighted by the recent appointment of Shawqi Ibrahim ‘Abd al-Karim as the country’s first post-revolutionary mufti, could last a generation and does not hinge on a single appointment.
In an interview with the Council on Foreign Relations, Marina Ottaway says that the background behind the current political crisis in Egypt revolves around a real struggle for power between the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties and secular opposition parties.
Marina Ottaway says that after almost two years of an uncertain and poorly managed transition, the battle for control over Egypt is now fully engaged. It will not lead to democracy. Egypt’s transition is not drawing to a close and the future promises to be messier than the past.
The Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement on October 31, 2012 clarifying the meaning of sharia and its place in Egypt. The statement was originally published on Ikhwanweb and is republished here.
Nathan J. Brown writes that Egypt’s transition may be lurching toward a more pluralist democracy, prolonged instability, renewed authoritarianism, or toward a kind of delegative democracy in which a leader with a popular mandate is able to rule without much oversight and accountability.
Egypt’s president and military are working together and seem firmly in control. But Morsi’s recent personnel and constitutional moves greatly enhance the presidency’s power.
The sweeping steps announced by Morsi aroused a variety of reactions, mostly predictable, by Egyptian political factions. Responses have been by and large favorable, although in many cases guardedly so, with the only truly negative comments coming from groups that are strongly opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood.
On June 24, Egyptian President-Elect Mohamed Morsi released his plan for his first one hundred days in office, outlining five major themes that he wants to concentrate on during these one hundred days.
On Sunday, June 24, Egypt’s Higher Electoral Commission released the results of the presidential election, which had been held on June 16 and 17. Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi was named the winner.
Marina Ottaway writes that the fact that Morsi’s victory was allowed to stand marks a major change in Egypt, but it is only one step in a process of transformation that will take time, be punctuated by many acrimonious battles, and in the end may not lead to democracy.
Nathan J. Brown writes that the developments in Egypt over the past few days have thrown what had been a confused set of institutional arrangements into even greater disarray and threatened the already tenuous transition to democracy.
Despite the deeply problematic results of the first round of Egypt’s presidential elections, there is reason for optimism because the democratic spirit that seems to have struck deep roots in the society may still ensure that when everything that could go wrong does go wrong, the country can still recover.
Egypt’s post-revolutionary environment—and especially its constitutional process—has touched off debates within the country and confusion outside of it regarding the role of the Islamic sharia in the emerging legal and political order.
The rapid developments over the past month have shown that legal and constitutional loopholes have the potential to seriously undermine Egypt’s democratic transition.
With its impressive electoral victory the Muslim Brotherhood must start setting its foreign policy, economic, and cultural priorities. With the Salafis entering the political arena for the first time, the Brotherhood Party may be forced to choose between competing with them for the Islamist base and reassuring non-Islamist political forces at home and abroad.
After Egypt’s first round of elections, the FJP and the Brotherhood have shown a great deal of political acumen in not embracing an alliance with the Salafis. It is crucial that secular parties show equal acumen by cooperating with the FJP.
Early polling in Egypt suggests that Islamist movements are receiving the bulk of the vote, but both the country and the Muslim Brotherhood might be better served by an outcome like Tunisia’s, where Islamists have political strength but must still reach out to others to get anything done.
In a video Q & A, Dr. Hamdi Hassan, a Member of the People’s Assembly representing the Muslim Brotherhood, discusses his the Brotherhood’s decision to participate in the parliamentary elections.
The overall political climate in Egypt and the internal Brotherhood context are likely to sap the group’s organizational and mobilizational capacities and it seems increasingly likely that the Brotherhood will have a weaker showing in the upcoming elections than it did in 2005.
