Egyptian political parties are difficult to categorize in terms of their ideological leanings, because many of them reject the labels others affix to them. The Freedom and Justice Party, for example, is clearly seen as an Islamist party by outsiders, but rejects that definition and calls itself a civil party instead. Parties that analysts consider secular angrily reject that definition. Parties are thus listed here simply in alphabetical order. The discussion of the alliances being formed among political parties gives an indication, if not of the ideological leanings of the parties, at least of the way in which they are trying to position themselves to attract votes.
Egypt’s post-revolutionary environment—and especially its constitutional process—has touched off debates within the country and confusion outside of it regarding the role of the Islamic sharia in the emerging legal and political order.
The rapid developments over the past month have shown that legal and constitutional loopholes have the potential to seriously undermine Egypt’s democratic transition.
The decision to abandon its pledge not to run a presidential candidate is a strong indication of the the Brotherhood’s conversion to a fully political logic.
Results from the Shura Council elections that took place in two stages beginning on January 29, 2012 and ending on February 22, 2012.
Egypt’s protest movement is fractured, loosely connected by ambiguous and undefined demands and slogans. It is mostly made up of a vast multitude of small political parties, protest movements, civil society groups, and informal independent activists, each with its own leadership structure. Attempts to coalesce the protest movement into larger bodies have led to a [...]
A profile of the non-Islamists in Egypt’s new People’s Assembly.
Results from Egypt’s People’s Assembly elections, including seat breakdown, minority representation, proportional representation list seats results, and individual member district results.
With its impressive electoral victory the Muslim Brotherhood must start setting its foreign policy, economic, and cultural priorities. With the Salafis entering the political arena for the first time, the Brotherhood Party may be forced to choose between competing with them for the Islamist base and reassuring non-Islamist political forces at home and abroad.
Preliminary results of the first and second stage of elections for Egypt’s People’s Assembly.
Responses to the Salafi electoral success suggest an effort to marginalize Egypt’s new Islamist leaders. This approach will most likely prove unwise, as the democratic process, political involvement, and electoral accountability will continue to moderate Salafi views and policies over the long term. Overturning their electoral gains will reverse this trend and further empower these groups by placing them back in the seat of opposition.
Challenging the SCAF requires sustained unity of purpose and determination among civilian leaders and political parties and movements, and a favorable external environment, neither of which is assured at present.
Egypt’s protracted series of parliamentary balloting has just begun, but it is not too soon to think about the implications of presidential elections that have yet to be scheduled and which may be a cause deep concern.
After Egypt’s first round of elections, the FJP and the Brotherhood have shown a great deal of political acumen in not embracing an alliance with the Salafis. It is crucial that secular parties show equal acumen by cooperating with the FJP.
Unless the Islamists and liberals can find a way to coexist in Egyptian politics, Egypt risks falling into a new authoritarianism, with the military and the liberals undermining the democratic process to prevent Islamist participation.
